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We study the conditions that ensure rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
determinacy and expectational stability (E-stability) in a standard sticky-price
model augmented with the cost channel. We allow for varying degrees of pass-
through of the policy rate to bank-lending rates. Strong cost-side effects heavily
constrain the policy rate response to inflation from above, so that inflation tar-
geting policies may not be capable of ensuring REE uniqueness. In such cases,
it is advisable to combine inflation responses with an appropriate reaction to the
output gap and/or firm profitability. The negative reaction of real activity and
asset prices to inflationary shocks adds a negative force to inflation responses that
counteracts the borrowing cost effect and avoids expectations of higher inflation to
become self-fulfilling.
JEL: E31; E32; E52
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1 Introduction
Financial intermediation and corporate credit play a central role in the transmission of
monetary policy, determining the impact of interest rate changes on the prices of goods
and assets. This paper examines a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bank-
lending shapes the transmission of monetary policy on firm profitability, through the
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so-called cost channel.1 We characterize the conditions that ensure rational expectations
equilibrium uniqueness and stability under adaptive learning (E-stability) in the presence
of varying degrees of pass-through from policy to bank-lending rates. Furthermore, we
explore the interplay between asset prices and cost-side effects, as well as the implications
of allowing the monetary authority to respond to asset prices, so as to enhance both price
and financial stability.
Monetary policy supply-side effects classically arise from agency problems between
producers and lenders. The importance of this channel crucially depends on the pass-
through from policy to bank-lending rates. Chowdhury et al. (2006) show that heteroge-
neous financial systems can lead to major differences in the transmission of policy shocks:
along with countries where the banking sector acts as an attenuator of changes in the
risk-free rate (e.g., France and Germany), there are countries where bank-lending rates
amplify movements in the policy rate (e.g., Japan and the US). The second case is central
to our analysis.
Along with the traditional Taylor principle, the cost channel implies the emergence
of an upper bound to inflation responses that prevents the central bank from being
too aggressive in stabilizing inflation, if determinacy has to be attained. In contrast to
previous studies, (e.g., Bruckner and Schabert, 2003, Surico, 2008 and Llosa and Tuesta,
2009), we show that the additional constraint may become a reason of concern for the
policy maker when movements in the policy rate are amplified by the banking sector. In
fact, the upper frontier may become so stringent that determinacy cannot be attained if
the central bank acts as a pure inflation targeter. In such cases setting the policy rate in
response to both inflation and the output gap may be desirable. Reacting to real activity
adds a negative force to inflation responses that counteracts the borrowing cost effect
operating through the direct influence of the lending rate on aggregate supply.
A main focus of the paper is to examine the role of monetary policy when the cost
channel "matters" and affects firm profitability. Despite the increasing emphasis on the
connection between financial frictions and macroeconomic fluctuations, the influence of
cost-side effects on firm profits and asset prices has generally been neglected. We show
that responding to asset prices helps at attaining determinacy when strong credit market
distortions are at work. In this respect, two distinct effects are isolated. On the one
hand, as shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) reacting to asset prices weakens the
overall policy response to inflationary shocks, thus making the lower bound to inflation
responses more stringent. On the other hand, a positive response to asset prices brings
about much higher gains, in terms of increased chances to attain determinacy, outweighing
the borrowing cost effect that operates in the model with the cost-channel. In turn, the
second effect emerges as the outcome of two mutually reinforcing mechanisms that exploit
the amplification induced by strong degrees of pass-through from policy to bank-lending
rates. To see this, consider an increase in the nominal rate of interest aimed at offsetting
the inflationary consequences of a demand or supply shock. When the central bank
adjusts the policy rate in response to asset prices misalignments, the negative deviation
of firm profits from their level under flexible prices exerts a direct impact on inflation that
counteracts the borrowing cost effect on aggregate supply. In addition, the cost channel
implies a direct influence of interest rate changes on firm dividends that dominates the
1The literature on the cost channel has shown that, along with the usual demand-side transmission
channel, monetary policy significantly affects the supply-side of the economy through the influence of
the nominal rate of interest on firms’costs of production. See, among others, Christiano et al. (1997),
Barth and Ramey (2000), Ravenna and Walsh (2006), Chowdhury et al. (2006) and Tillmann (2008).
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negative correlation between the output gap and the dividend gap that generally arises in
models with nominal rigidities. Together, these mechanisms avoid expectations of higher
inflation to become self-fulfilling.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical
setting; Section 3 shows that implementing rules that are exclusively aimed at stabilizing
inflation may never ensure determinacy and E-stability in the presence of strong cost-side
effects; Section 4 explores the connection between firm profitability and the cost channel,
and shows that adjusting the policy rate in response to asset prices misalignments may
help at alleviating the problems of dynamic instability highlighted in the previous section.
The last section concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy is populated by households, firms and financial intermediaries.
Households have preferences defined over a variety of consumption goods, supply labor
to monopolistically competitive firms and deposit funds at the financial intermediaries.
Firms utilize labor to produce goods and borrow from financial intermediaries to finance
the wage bill, which has to be covered before revenues are collected. The decision prob-
lems of households and firms follow the standard treatment of Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
and are outlined in Appendix A1. This section describes the role of financial intermedi-
aries and reports the log-linearized model economy.
2.1 Financial Intermediation
We assume that financial intermediaries receive deposits Mdt (remunerated at the gross
rate Rt) from households and a cash injection Xt from the monetary authority. Moreover,
they supply loans Lt to firms at the (gross) nominal rate Rlt. These funds are used to
finance the wage bill, WtNt, where Wt and Nt denote the real wage and the labor input,
respectively. Following Chowdhury et al. (2006), we allow for varying degrees of interest
rate changes to affect firms’cost of borrowing. For simplicity, we assume that this friction
can be measured by an increasing function of the nominal rate of interest, Ψt (Rt) ∈ (0, 1),
which can be interpreted as a measure of defaults on loans.2 Moreover, we assume an
explicit cost to manage loans, which amounts to κl(≥ 0) per unit of loan. Intermediaries
operate in a competitive environment. Nominal profits in the banking sector are defined
as:
Πint = Rlt [1−Ψ(Rt)]Lt −RtMdt − κlLt. (1)
The following bank balance sheet condition must hold in every period: Lt = Mdt + Xt.
From the maximization of (1) subject to this constraint we obtain a relationship that
links deposit and loan rates. In log-linear terms such no-arbitrage condition reads as:3
2As discussed by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) this situation can be rationalized, in the presence of
asymmetric information, by the willingness of a firm to invest in risky projects at high levels of the
risk-free rate.
3Variables without a time subscript are evaluated at their steady state. For a generic variable Xt








the percentage deviation of its value under
sticky (flexible) prices from the steady state level. Moreover, log-linear "gap variables" are reported
without superscripts, i.e. xt ≡ x̂t − x̂ft .
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r̂lt = (1 + ψ) r̂t, where ψ(= ψ1 − ψ2) captures the elasticity of the contractual interest
rate to percentage changes in the policy rate. This results from the combination of












. A negative ψ
indicates that a change in the risk-free interest rate is not completely passed through to
the lending rate.4 This is the case when managing costs are too high, and the cost channel
is mitigated. Alternatively, Hannan and Berger (1991) attribute this effect to loan price
rigidities.5 When ψ is positive, a rise in the policy rate is even accelerated, so that
the lending rate rises by more than one-to-one.6 This can be viewed as a reduced-form
relation based on financial market imperfections stemming from asymmetric information
between borrowers and lenders, as advocated by the literature on the financial accelerator
(see Bernanke et. al., 1999).
2.2 Log-linear System
The first order conditions characterizing the decisions of households and firms are log-
linearized around the steady state. The linearized economy features a IS curve and an
aggregate short-run aggregate supply (AS) schedule:
yt = Etyt+1 −
1
σ
(rt − Etπt+1) , (2)
πt = βEtπt+1 + κ (1 + ψ) rt + κ (σ + η) yt + εt, (3)
where yt is the output gap, πt is the rate of inflation, rt is the nominal interest rate gap
and εt is a cost-push term that derives from assuming a log-stationary process from the
elasticity of substitution in consumption, θ.7 Moreover, β denotes households’discount
factor, σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, η is the inverse
of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, while κ = (1− ωβ) (1− ω)ω−1, where 1 − ω is
the probability that firms can re-optimize their prices at each given period, as in Calvo
(1983).
From households’optimization problem we also retrieve a linearized relationship that
describes the evolution of the stock price gap, qt:
qt = (1− β) dt + βEtqt+1 − β (rt − Etπt+1) , (4)
where dt is the dividend gap. We assume that profits are fully transferred to the stock-
holders, so that dividends are Dt = Yt−RltWtNt and the log-linear dividend gap reads as
dt = ςyt− µrt, where ς = 1− (θ − 1) (σ + η) and µ = (θ − 1) (1 + ψ). Note that ς is neg-
ative for a wide range of plausible parameterizations. The negative relationship between
dt and yt is a characteristic feature of models with nominal rigidities and it represents
the key to explain why adjusting the policy rate in response to movements in the price
of assets may harm dynamic stability when only the demand channel of the monetary
transmission mechanism is at work.8 A novel feature in the specification of the dividend
4According to Chowdhury et al. (2006), this is the case for France (ψ = −0.8) and Germany (ψ =
−0.04).
5According to their evidence, financial intermediaries acting in imperfectly competitive environments
do not fully adapt to changes in the policy rate, so as to increase their profit margins.
6Chowdhury et al. (2006) estimate a positive ψ for Italy (ψ = 0.5), Canada (ψ = 0.1), the UK and
US (ψ = 0.3).
7See Steinsson (2003) and Ireland (2004).
8As explained by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), other things equal, an increase in the rate of inflation
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gap stems from the direct influence of the interest rate gap on dt. The magnitude of this
effect —which is indexed by µ —increases in the degree of pass-through and is paramount
to explain why responding to firm profitability may increase the chances to attain deter-
minacy in the presence of strong supply-side effects. Section 4 will explore this point in
close detail. We plug the dividend gap into (4) to get:
qt = βEtqt+1 + βEtπt+1 + εyt − ξrt, (5)
where ε = (1− β) ς and ξ = β + (1− β)µ. Coeffi cient ξ suggests that, compared to the
baseline setting with no cost channel, the effect of rt on the asset price gap is reinforced.9
3 Determinacy and E-stability under Benchmark In-
terest Rate Rules
This section explores rational expectations equilibrium (REE) determinacy and stability
under adaptive learning (E-stability). To close the model we alternatively consider Taylor-
type rules that differ with respect to their timing and the information set available to
the policy maker. The central bank may adjust the nominal rate of interest in response
to movements in current (or expected) inflation, the output gap and the stock price gap.
To build some intuition on the interplay between monetary policy and firm profitability
in the presence of cost-side effects, we find instructive to first explore rules whereby the
policy maker pursues nominal and real stability (Section 3), while postponing to Section
4 the analysis of rules that account for the dynamics of asset prices.
After substituting a specific policy rule into (2), (3) and (5), the resulting model can
be reported as:
Γxt = Φ + ΩEtxt+1 + Ξ$t, (6)
$t = ρ$t−1+εt, (7)
where xt = [πt, yt, qt]
′
, $t is a vector shocks, Γ, Ω, Φ are matrices of structural pa-
rameters. Exogenous variables are assumed to follow a first-order stationary VAR with
iid innovations and diagonal covariance matrix. It can be shown that REE uniqueness
obtains if and only if the eigenvalues of Γ−1Ω have real parts lying in the unit circle.
Moreover, a necessary and suffi cient condition for E-stability is that J (= Γ−1Ω− I ) has
all roots with negative real parts (see Evans and Honkapohja, 2001).10
The model (6)-(7) falls within the class considered by McCallum (2007), according
to which determinacy is a suffi cient (though not necessary) condition for E-stability.
Therefore, unique evolutionary stable RE solutions detected in this framework retain the
property of E-stability. Moreover, we will also observe cases characterized by both in-
determinacy and E-stability. These non-fundamental solutions will be briefly discussed,
although most of the analysis will be restricted to the study of the fundamental solu-
determines a higher marginal cost and thus lower dividends and share prices, so that the overall response
to inflation falls as the response to asset prices increases.
9Moreover, it is interesting to note that an increase in the elasticity of substitution, θ, exerts a
detrimental effect on the asset price gap along two directions: (i) via the output gap (yt) and (ii) via the
interest rate gap (rt). The second effect is further amplified in the presence of strong cost-side effects
(ψ  0).
10More details on the conditions that ensure determinacy and E-stability are reported in Appendix B.
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tions (i.e., MSV-type solutions). In addition, Section 3.1.1 will consider a rule based on
expectations of contemporaneous data. It should be noted that under "nowcasting" the
model features expectations of the endogenous state variables at both time t and t + 1,
so that (6) is replaced by Γnxt = Φ + ΛnEtxt + ΩnEtxt+1 + Ξ$t, where "n" stands for
nowcasting. As such, the model does not belong to the class examined by McCallum
(2007) and E-instability may even characterize determinate equilibria.
3.1 Contemporaneous Data Rules
We start by assuming a central bank that adjusts the rate of interest in response to
movements in the contemporaneous rate of inflation (i.e., rt = χππt, χπ > 0). The
following proposition formalizes the conditions for determinacy in connection with the
magnitude of cost-side effects. As such, it retains considerable importance for those
monetary authorities that are primarily or exclusively concerned with inflation stability.11
Proposition 1 Under the contemporaneous data rule rt = χππt the following conditions




χπ < χ̂π =
σ(1−β)
κ(σψ−η) ; iii) iff ψ >
η−σ
2σ
: χπ < χ̃π =
2σ(1+β)+κ(σ+η)
κ(σ(1+2ψ)−η) . Proof: See Appendix C.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Thus, along with a lower bound to inflation responses (χπ), depending on the mag-
nitude of ψ different constraints may arise that bound inflation responses from above.
To enhance a visual understanding of Proposition 1, we plot the conditions that ensure
E-stability and determinacy, for different values of the pass-through parameter and al-
ternative parameterizations of σ and κ: following Woodford (1999), we set σ = 0.157
and κ = 0.0235/(σ + η), while McCallum and Nelson (1999) select σ = 1/0.164 and
κ = 0.3/(σ+η). As to the other structural coeffi cients, we set β = 0.99, η = 2 and θ = 6.
The left hand panel of Figure 1 shows that a strong degree of pass-through may imply
that determinacy is never attained if the central bank acts as a pure inflation targeter.
This is due to the intersection of the upper and lower frontiers that determinacy imposes
on inflation responses.12 Given our parameterization, Proposition 1 allows us to com-
pute numerical ranges of the pass-through coeffi cient that are characterized by different
properties in terms of dynamic stability. In fact, equilibrium uniqueness can never be




(≈ 0.60): this is the point where χ̂π intersects χπ. Otherwise,
determinacy is always ensured for ψ < η−σ
2σ
(≈ −0.34), as long as χπ > χπ = 1. Between
these thresholds we determine two constraints that prevent the central bank from re-
sponding too strongly to inflation, χ̂π and χ̃π: the latter lies beyond the numerical range
we consider in Figure 1,13 while χ̂π kicks in for ψ & 0.45 in the sub-space examined.
Such a situation has not been documented by previous studies, which only accounted for
ψ ≤ 0: in this case a moderate response to inflation would always ensure determinacy, as
long as the Taylor principle is respected. By contrast, for ψ > 0 we need to explore the
possibility of introducing additional targets in the policy maker’s reaction function.
11The conditions ensuring E-stability are reported in Proposition 2 (Appendix C).
12As reflected by Figure 1(b), this is not the case under the calibration proposed by Woodford (1999).
However, in the next sections we will see how even under Woodford’s calibration the conditions that
ensure determinacy and E-stability may be severely affected when alternative rules are implemented.
13It can be shown that the locus χ̃π crosses χ̂π from below. Thus, given the parameterization we use
χ̃π is the relevant upper constraint to inflation responses for ψ ∈ (−0.34, 0.33).
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We first allow for the possibility of reacting to contemporaneous inflation and the
output gap: rt = χππt + χyyt. Note that the analysis in the remainder of the paper will
often be complemented by numerical simulations of the model over a parameter sub-space
of the policy reaction coeffi cients.14 Unless otherwise indicated, each numerical exercise is
performed under three different values of the pass-through parameter, ψ = {−1, 0, 0.5},
so as to appreciate the effects induced by varying intensities through which the cost
channel operates.
Insert Figure 2 about here
As displayed by Figure 2(a), ruling out the cost channel returns the condition em-
bodied by the well-known Taylor principle, whereby determinacy is attained as long
as (κ (σ + η))−1 (1− β)χy + χπ > 1. However, when cost-side effects are at work this
principle may no longer be suffi cient to ensure determinacy. Under a perfect degree of
pass-through the area of indeterminacy expands [see Figure 2(b)]: the minimum bound
to inflation responses shifts up along the χπ axis and increases in χy. This situation is
analogous to that analyzed by Surico (2008) and Llosa and Tuesta (2009). As the former
first pointed out, higher inflation expectations may become self-fulfilling when the cost
channel is at work. In fact, a central bank that assigns a positive response to real activity
renders the economy more prone to multiple equilibria, as the output gap may not be
"negative enough" to offset inflationary pressures.15 However, it is possible to show that
the analysis of Surico (2008) is only valid as long as movements in the policy rate are
not amplified by the banking sector. As hinted by Figure 2(c), a higher degree of pass-
through (ψ = 0.5) implies that reacting exclusively to the rate of inflation never ensures
equilibrium uniqueness. Whenever the central bank does not react to the output gap,




, a region of indeterminacy can be detected along
the χπ axis, which stems from the intersection between the upper and lower bounds to
inflation responses, as reported in Proposition 1. Interestingly, sunspot equilibria in this
region are E-stable: this property has not been previously documented in standard New
Keynesian models with contemporaneous data rules, as those examined by Bullard and
Mitra (2002) and Honkapohja and Mitra (2004).16 Even when accounting for cost-side
effects, Llosa and Tuesta (2009) do not point to any discrepancy between the conditions
that ensure E-stability and REE uniqueness under contemporaneous data rules [i.e., a
14In the remainder we will mainly report numerical exercises under the parameterization proposed
by McCallum and Nelson (1999). Simulations under alternative calibrations generally deliver similar
results. Additional numerical exercises are available, upon request, from the authors.
15To provide an intuitive explanation of this statement, consider a situation in which the interest rate
increases in response to a supply or demand shock, producing a positive ex-ante real interest rate. By
responding to current inflation the central bank may trigger even stronger inflationary pressures through
the direct impact of the nominal rate of interest on aggregate supply. In this case the negative output
gap induced by the monetary tightening may offset the inflationary pressures arising from the shock.
However, an explicit reaction to the output gap may weaken this counter-balancing force, thus rendering
the system more prone to indeterminacy.
16Honkapohja and Mitra (2004) point out that E-stable sunspots may only occur when agents form
expectations at time t for time t+ 1, while just observing realizations of the endogenous state variables
at period t−1. In this respect, sunspots that take the form of a martingale difference sequence are always
E-unstable. By contrast, sunspots that take the form of a finite state Markov process may be E-stable
for some parameterizations of the policy rule. In addition to finite state Markov sunspots, Evans and
McGough (2005) show that in the plausible range of responses to the intermediate targets, E-stable
sunspots assuming a common factor representation may be detected. As such, these sunspots represent
a "threat" to monetary policy, as the public could potentially coordinate on them.
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situation analogous to that pictured in Figure 2(b)]. However, a disconnection between
determinacy and E-stability is highlighted when allowing for a positive pass-through.17
Given the impossibility of attaining a unique equilibrium under strong cost-side effects,
the policy maker may need to combine inflation responses with an "appropriate" response
to the output gap.18 To provide some analytical intuition for this result, we find useful
to recall the (suffi cient and necessary) conditions for determinacy reported by Llosa and
Tuesta (2009), suitably adapted to match our notation:19
(1− β − (1 + ψ)κ) (κ (σ + η))−1 χy + χπ > 1, (8)
2σ (1 + β) + (1 + β + (1 + ψ)κ)χy + (η + σ (1− 2 (1 + ψ)))κχπ + κ (σ + η) > 0.
(9)
Condition (8) can be interpreted as a generalization of the Taylor principle. This is
affected by the cost channel through the output gap response. Specifically, at standard
calibrations the term multiplied by χy is negative, due to the presence of ψ (> −1): this
argument leads Surico (2008) to conclude that to avoid inducing multiple equilibria the
central bank should not respond to output gap movements, as this would weaken the
overall response to inflation. However, while condition (8) collapses to χπ > 1 (i.e., the
standard Taylor principle, with no role for the cost channel) when χy = 0, condition (9)
is still affected by ψ. In fact, if we assume χy = 0 and ψ > (η − σ) (2σ)
−1 condition
(9) translates into χπ < χ̃π, in agreement with Proposition 1. We should note that
χ̃π decreases in ψ, implying that in the event of credit conditions becoming more tight,
the maximum response to inflation beyond which determinacy cannot be attained is
constrained further.20 In the limit, credit market distortions may imply that the upper
bound becomes so stringent that no determinate outcome is attained (this event occurs
whenever χ̃π intersects χπ = 1), unless the central bank responds to the output gap, in
which case the left hand terms of both (8) and (9) increase in χy.
To gain further intuition on why responding to the output gap may be necessary to
attain determinacy, it is useful to reparameterize the New Keynesian Phillips curve under




1− κ (1 + ψ)χπ
Etπt+1 +
[
(1 + ψ)χy + (σ + η)
]
κ
1− κ (1 + ψ)χπ
yt. (10)
Recall that under strict inflation targeting determinacy may never be attained, no matter
the central bank’s aggressiveness in stabilizing inflation. To see this, consider an increase
in the nominal rate of interest aimed at offsetting the inflationary pressures triggered by
a demand or supply shock. The conventional prescription in this case is to generate a
17The reason why this situation occurs is clear after inspecting Proposition 2 (Appendix C), where
the thresholds for ψ in the analysis of E-stability do not match with those identified for the conditions
that ensure determinacy. Otherwise, no discrepancy emerges when considering a less-than-perfect pass-
through.
18This principle gains further relevance under a forward looking expectational rule, as it will be shown
in Section 3.2.
19The conditions reported by Llosa and Tuesta (2009) extend those of Surico (2008) in that they
consider no interest rate smoothing and a perfect pass-through between policy and bank-lending rates.
20Analogous considerations can be extended to the case of ψ > (η/σ). In fact, also χπ decreases in ψ.
21We set, without loss of generality, εt = 0.
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negative output gap. As hinted by Surico (2008), a positive χy may not allow the output
gap to be negative enough. However, this view is crucially based on the assumption of a
less than perfect pass-through. When ψ is high enough and χy = 0, the borrowing cost
effect always dominates the traditional real wage effect operating through the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, so that expectations of higher
inflation become self-fulfilling. By contrast, reacting to yt helps at counteracting the cost-
side effect, reinforcing the impact of the negative output gap on current inflation through
the direct influence of the rate of interest on aggregate supply. In fact, whereas reacting
to the rate of inflation scales the impact of all the variables on the right hand side of (10)
by the term (1− κ (1 + ψ)χπ)
−1, responding to real activity avoids the upper bound to
materialize. Importantly, the overall impact of yt on current inflation is amplified by the
magnitude of cost-side effects, as it increases in ψ.
3.1.1 Expectations of Current Data in the Policy Function
McCallum (1999) criticizes the use of rules that are not operational, i.e.: (i) rules that
are expressed in terms of instrumental variables that can hardly be controlled on a high-
frequency basis and (ii) rules that require information that cannot be plausibly possessed
by the monetary authority. In this respect, contemporaneous data rules such as those
explored in Section 3.1 are not operational. In response to this criticism, it is advisable
to inspect policy functions based on the expectations of current data. Bullard and Mitra
(2002) and Evans and McGough (2005) show that the analysis of determinacy under
nowcasting produces results that fully conform to those observed under contemporaneous
data rules. This result extends to the case under scrutiny.22
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here
However, it is interesting to note that contemporaneous data rules and rules featuring
nowcasting have rather different implications in terms of E-stability. In fact, Figure 3
shows that under rt = χπEtπt E-stability may be compromised at rather low values of ψ,
at least under the calibration proposed by McCallum and Nelson (1999). Most impor-
tantly, we note the existence of unique (locally) stationary but E-unstable equilibria.23
Analogous evidence occurs when the central bank reacts to both expected current infla-
tion and the output gap: under rt = χπEtπt + χyEtyt E-stability may never be attained
for a certain range of χy, even when policy and bank-lending rates co-move on a one-
to-one basis [see Figure 4(b)]. Thus, implementing a rule based on the expectations of
current data in the presence of cost-side effects may seriously affect the chances to obtain
E-stable equilibria, even when these are unique.
3.2 Forward Expectations in the Policy Function
Once again, we first consider a central bank that exclusively reacts to the expected rate of
inflation: rt = χπEtπt+1. As in the case of a contemporaneous data rule, an upper bound
to inflation responses can be detected, which prevents the monetary authority from being
too aggressive.24 Most importantly Figure 5, which reports the equilibrium properties
22In addition, it is possible to prove that the conditions for E-stability under nowcasting are equivalent
to those under the forward-looking rule, as we will see in Section 3.2.
23Moreover, as in Evans and McGough (2005) no indeterminate but E-stable equilibria are detected.
24Proposition 2 in Appendix C formalizes this result.
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of the system in the {ψ, χπ} sub-space, shows that a unique REE can be obtained just
at low values of the pass-through. Compared to a contemporaneous data rule, forward
expectations in the Taylor rule make the economy more prone to indeterminacy.
Insert Figure 5 about here
To overcome the limitations of a policy function that is exclusively focused on the
stabilization of expected price changes, we next implement rt = χπEtπt+1 + χyEtyt+1.
Insert Figure 6 about here
Figures 6(b) and 6(c) confirm that reacting to both the expected inflation rate and the
output gap is advisable to attain determinacy, at least when the cost channel "matters".
The intuition underlying this result develops along the same lines we have detailed in
Section 3.1 and rests on the observation that a strong pass-through may induce the
upper and lower frontiers to intersect.25
Moreover, the region of indeterminacy on the sub-space considered —most of which
emerges in correspondence with modest values of the response to the output gap — is
greater than that obtained under the contemporaneous data rule. To gain some intuition
on why forward looking rules make the system more prone to equilibrium multiplicity, it
is useful to re-parameterize the New Keynesian Phillips curve under rt = χπEtπt+1:
πt = [β + κ (1 + ψ)χπ]Etπt+1 + κ (σ + η) yt. (11)
Note that responding to the expected rate of inflation reinforces the feedback from Etπt+1
to πt — thus increasing the chances that expectations of higher inflation become self-
fulfilling in the face of inflationary shocks —while leaving the impact of the forcing variable
unaffected. Therefore, a shock that raises the nominal rate of interest may generate
inflationary pressures that can hardly be offset by the negative output gap, even if χy =
0. Importantly, such pressures increase in the degree of pass-through. By contrast,
undesirable outcomes are less likely to occur under the contemporaneous data rule, rt =
χππt, as in this case χπ scales the impact of both yt and Etπt+1 on current inflation. This
can be checked by setting χy = 0 in equation (10).
4 Asset Prices, the Cost Channel and Determinacy
So far we have shown that allowing for an amplification of movements in the policy rate
on bank-lending rates has non-negligible implications for equilibrium dynamics: unlike
the case of a less than perfect pass-through, reacting to both inflation and the output
gap may be necessary to avoid indeterminacy. This is particularly important when the
monetary authority reacts to forward expectations, as in this case the system is more
sensitive to feedback effects from expected to current inflation. Concurrently, credit
market distortions generally increase the chances to observe learnable sunspots, at least
under rules based on contemporaneous data and forward expectations, while expectations
of current data in the Taylor rule make the system more prone to determinate but E-
unstable equilibria.
25It is also possible to extend this reasoning to rules featuring an explicit response to the contempo-
raneous or the expected output gap.
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This section highlights important effects emanating from the interplay between credit
market distortions and firm profitability. We explore the implications of a central bank
that, along with responding to (current or expected) inflation and the output gap, displays
some concern for fluctuations in stock prices. We abstract from normative considerations
on why the policy maker may want to react to asset prices, while merely relying on the
evidence that supports this view (see, among others, Rigobon and Sack, 2003).
The general wisdom is that setting the policy rate in response to asset prices misalign-
ments renders the system more prone to indeterminacy.26 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007)
have explored the implications of responding to asset prices for equilibrium determinacy.27
Their key insight is that in the face of inflationary shocks that lower firm profits (and as-
set prices) an interest rate rule reacting to stock prices adds a negative force to the overall
response to inflation. If the share price response is large enough, indeterminacy cannot
be avoided, as the Taylor principle is violated. It is important to stress that Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2007) consider a standard situation in which responding to asset prices only
affects the lower bound to inflation responses through the conventional demand channel
of the monetary transmission mechanism. However, we have noted at different stages of
the analysis that in the presence of relevant cost-side effects the upper constraint may
represent a reason of concern.
Let us consider the following rule with forward expectations:28
rt = χπEtπt+1 + χyEtyt+1 + χqEtqt+1. (12)
Insert Figure 7 about here




and for ψ = {−1, 0, 0.5}. In each panel we consider different values of χq. Figure 7(a) ac-
counts for the situation examined by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) and clearly shows that
there are no benefits from reacting to asset prices, as the area of indeterminacy expands
as χq increases. In the absence of cost-side effects, responding to firm profitability has no
other implication but decreasing the chances to attain a unique equilibrium. Otherwise,
when the cost channel is accounted for the policy maker needs to select combinations
of χπ and χy that fall in the region of determinate equilibria between the lower and the
upper constraint to inflation responses. Section 3 has shown that the upper frontier may
become an issue of concern for high values of the pass-through coeffi cient. Figures 7(b)
and 7(c) clearly show that a positive reaction to asset prices raises both the lower and
the upper bound. However, while increasing χq only exerts a negligible impact on the
26A long-standing debate concerning the role and scope of central banks to stabilize asset prices has
developed since the contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) and Genberg et al. (2000). In
connection with problems of dynamic stability induced by Taylor rules that respond to share prices, refer
to Bullard and Schaling (2002) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007). More recently, Pfajfar and Santoro
(2011) have shown that adjusting the policy rate in response to asset prices growth does not harm
dynamic stability and may promote determinacy by inducing interest-rate inertia.
27We should stress that Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) explore this situation in the presence of wage
rigidity and different timings for money demand. In our setting such extensions are bound to be of
marginal importance. In fact, unlike the sticky price model, in a sticky wage model profits will fall with
positive interest rate innovations. Thus, sticky wages induce an effect on firm profits that works in the
same direction as the cost channel. Concurrently, under typical calibrations according to which wages
and prices are rather sticky, the money demand timing is almost irrelevant to the stability properties of
the New Keynesian model explored by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
28It is possible to show that analogous principles apply to contemporaneous data rules or under now-
casting.
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bottom frontier, shifts in the upper bound are by far more important. In fact, even a
modest response to stock prices avoids the two frontiers to intersect. To provide an in-
tuition of why the lower bound shifts upward, it is useful to explore the effect induced
by an inflationary shock. In the model with the cost channel each percentage point of
permanently higher inflation implies a permanent change in the dividend gap of:29
dd
dπ
= −1 + ψ
σ + η
− (1− β) [(σ + η) (θ − 1)− 1]
κ (σ + η)
, (13)
which can be shown to be negative for a wide range of parameter values and to increase
in ψ (in absolute value). Thus, as predicted by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), a trade-off
between inflation and asset prices stabilization arises in the perspective of attaining a
unique REE. Note that an analogous trade-off also emerges between inflation and out-
put stabilization, as hinted by (8). In fact, a one percent permanent increase in inflation
induces a (negative) change in the output gap of [1− β − (1 + ψ)κ] [κ (σ + η)]−1 percent-
age points (as opposed to (1− β) [κ (σ + η)]−1 with no cost channel):30 this translates




sub-space [see Figures 2(b,c)].
Nonetheless, the cost-channel urges us to account for the upper constraint to χπ as
well. In this respect, adjusting the rate of interest in response to asset prices misalign-
ments has similar effects as responding to real activity: a positive χq channels a negative
force on aggregate supply that outweighs the borrowing effect on inflation dynamics,
thus avoiding expectations of higher inflation to become self-fulfilling. Importantly, such
a negative effect is amplified by the direct impact of interest rate changes on firm profits:
to see this, recall that the elasticity of the dividend gap to the nominal rate of interest,
µ = (θ − 1) (1 + ψ), increases in the intensity of cost-side effects. Overall, this translates
into an upward shift in the upper bound to χπ, so that any intersection with the bottom
frontier is avoided.
The main point of departure from the result of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) lies in
the role of the upper bound to inflation responses and its relevance in the presence of
strong cost-side effects. It is true that the lower constraint becomes more stringent as
χq increases, and more so when the cost-channel is accounted for [to see this, consider
the term − (1 + ψ) (σ + η)−1 in (13), which is null for ψ = −1]. However, when cost-side
effects are high enough there are considerably higher gains from responding to asset prices
—at least in terms of increased chances to attain a determinate equilibrium31 —in that
the upper constraint is relaxed.
Thus, in the presence of strong cost-side effects that would otherwise prevent the
attainment of REE equilibrium uniqueness, it is advisable to combine inflation responses
with an explicit reaction to the output gap and/or asset prices. This allows the central
bank to turn the cost channel at its own advantage, through the direct impact of the
nominal rate of interest on aggregate supply. In this respect, reacting to asset prices
proves to be quite effi cient at avoiding the upper constraint to inflation responses to
29This elasticity can be retrieved by setting, for a generic variable xt, Etxt+1 = xt = x.
30While in the baseline scenario (i.e., under ψ = −1) any increment in the steady-state rate of inflation
leads to a higher output gap (dy/dπ > 0), under the cost channel we may assist to a permanent reduction
in the output gap (dy/dπ < 0), with the magnitude of this response increasing (in absolute value) in ψ.
31It could be noted that reacting to the stock price gap requires knowledge of asset prices under flexible
goods prices. These are typically unobservable. However, it is important to stress that the conditions for
determinacy and E-stability would not be qualitatively affected even if we were to consider a linearized
model with variables expressed in percentage deviation from their steady state.
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materialize, as it exploits the direct influence of interest rate changes on firm profitability.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have extended the cost channel framework of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) in two
main directions: first, following Chowdhury et al. (2006), we allow for the introduction
of varying degrees of interest rate changes to affect firms’cost of borrowing; second, we
consider the direct influence of credit market distortions on firm profitability and stock
price dynamics. The standard conditions ensuring REE uniqueness and E-stability are
significantly altered in the presence of strong cost-side effects, i.e. when movements in
the policy rate are amplified by the lending rate.
When changes in the policy rate are accelerated by the loan rate, conventional inflation
targeting policies may not be effective at ensuring determinacy, regardless of the timing
of the policy rule and the information set available to the policy maker. In contrast to
much of the existing literature we show that, along with reacting to the rate of inflation,
it may be necessary to adjust the policy rate in response to movements in real activity.
Although responding to the output gap makes the lower bound to inflation responses
more stringent, it produces greater benefits by relaxing the upper constraint. Along the
same lines, we show that the policy maker may increase the chances to attain determinacy
and E-stability when the cost channel matters, while reacting to asset prices. As in the
case considered by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), firm profitability reacts negatively in
response to inflationary shocks, and more so in the presence cost-side effects. In otherwise
standard frameworks this effect reduces the overall response to inflation, thus decreasing
the chances to attain determinacy. However, along with inducing this second-order effect,
reacting to asset prices counteracts the borrowing cost effect operating in the model with
the cost channel, ultimately avoiding the intersection between the frontiers that bound
inflation responses from above and below.
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Figures
Figure 1: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χππt.
Notes. Figure 1(a) is obtained under the parameterization for σ and κ proposed by Mc-
Callum and Nelson (1999), while 1(b) is based on the parameters of Woodford (1999). Black:
indeterminacy and E-instability; light grey: indeterminacy and E-stability; white: determinacy
and E-stability.
Figure 2: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χππt + χyyt.
Notes. ψ is alternatively set to -1(a), 0(b), 0.5(c). Black: indeterminacy and E-instability;
light grey: indeterminacy and E-stability; white: determinacy and E-stability.
Figure 3: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χπEtπt.
Notes. Figure 3(a) is obtained under the parameterization for σ and κ proposed by Mc-
Callum and Nelson (1999), while 3(b) is based on the parameters of Woodford (1999). Black:
indeterminacy and E-instability; dark grey: determinacy and E-instability; white: determinacy
and E-stability.
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Figure 4: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χπEtπt + χyEtyt.
Notes. ψ is alternatively set to -1(a), 0(b), 0.5(c). Black: indeterminacy and E-instability;
dark grey: determinacy and E-instability; white: determinacy and E-stability.
Figure 5: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χπEtπt+1.
Notes. Figure 5(a) is obtained under the parameterization for σ and κ proposed by Mc-
Callum and Nelson (1999), while 5(b) is based on the parameters of Woodford (1999). Black:
indeterminacy and E-instability; light grey: indeterminacy and E-stability; white: determinacy
and E-stability.
Figure 6: Determinacy and E-stability under rt = χπEtπt+1 + χyEtyt+1.
Notes. ψ is alternatively set to -1(a), 0(b), 0.5(c). Black: indeterminacy and E-instability;
light grey: indeterminacy and E-stability; white: determinacy and E-stability.
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Figure 7: Determinacy under rt = χπEtπt+1 + χyEtyt+1 + χqEtqt+1.
Notes: ψ is alternatively set to -1(a), 0(b), 0.5(c). In each panel, χq is alternatively set to
0 (dotted line), 0.05 (dashed line), 0.1 (thin continuous line) and 0.15 (thick continuous line).
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Appendix A: The Model
Appendix A1: Decision Problems of Households and Firms
Households
Households have preferences defined over a composite consumption good, Ct, and leisure,














where β is the intertemporal discount factor, Ht = exp(ht) is a taste shock,32 σ denotes
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and η is the inverse of the Frisch










where Cjt is the consumption of the good produced by firm j. Following Steinsson
(2003) and Ireland (2004), we allow for a log-stationary stochastic process to describe the
evolution of the elasticity of substitution in demand (θt).
As to the budget constraint, we follow the setup of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and
assume that households, whose labor supply is remunerated at the real wage Wt, enter
period t with cash holdings Mt. Before households enter the goods market, they de-
posit funds Mdt at financial intermediaries, which in turn remunerate them at the gross
interest Rt(= 1 + it). Consumption expenditures are restricted by the following liquidity
constraint:
PtCt ≤Mt −Mdt + PtWtNt. (16)
We also assume that households enter period t with At−1 shares of stock that sell at price
Qt and pay dividend Dt. As we deal with a representative-agent setting, households’
investment does not affect their consumption through feedback effects from asset prices.
We make this choice so as to enhance comparability between our results and those of
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
The intertemporal budget constraint reads as:
PtCt + PtQtAt +Mt+1 +M
d
t ≤Mt + PtAtDt +RtMdt + PtQtAt−1 + PtWtNt. (17)
Maximizing (14) subject to (16), and (19) leads to a set of first-order conditions that can
















32A taste shock is introduced to account for the competing effects of supply and demand side innova-











where πt denotes the rate of inflation. Equilibrium in the goods market requires Yt = Ct.
Note that equations (19) and (20) imply the usual no-arbitrage condition:





EtQt+1 + ζt, (21)
where, following Smets and Wouters (2003), the term ζt accounts for the risk implied
by the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the nominal gross rate of
return on stocks.
Firms
Following Ravenna and Walsh (2006), we assume that a generic firm j borrows an amount
WtNjt from intermediaries at the gross nominal rate Rlt. It is assumed that firms are
completely rationed on the equity market: although they could in principle issue equity
to finance their production, this option is a priori ruled out, due to the possibility that new
equity issues would be subject to adverse selection phenomena (see Myers and Majluf,
1984), thus resulting as too costly. At a given share price, only overvalued firms are
willing to sell their shares. As potential shareholders anticipate this fact, no trade occurs
on the equity market. Under these conditions, the announcement of an equity issue
is generally interpreted as bad news by investors and, in extreme situations, the stock
market becomes a market for lemons.33
As to price-setting, we follow Calvo (1983). The probability that a firm optimally
adjusts its price in each period is 1 − ω. The remaining fraction of firms (ω) leave
their price unchanged. If a firm sets its price at time t, it will do so by maximizing
expected profits subject to the demand function for its good and a constant return to
scale production technology Yjt = ZtNjt, where Yjt denotes firm-specific output and Zt
is a stochastic aggregate productivity factor. The cost minimization problem reads as:
min
Njt
RltWtNjt + Φt [Yjt − ZtNjt] . (22)
The real marginal cost resulting from the cost minimization problem is Φt = RltSt, where
St = Wt/Zt.
Appendix A2: Log-linearized System under Flexible Prices
We report the following set of log-linearized relationships describing the evolution of
the nominal rate of interest, output, profits, and stock prices in the absence of nominal
33Asymmetric information only affects the equity market. As to the credit market, it is assumed that



































Appendix B: Determinacy and E-stability
Let us write the model under the following state space form, after implementing a specific
interest rate rule:
Γxt = Φ + ΩEtxt+1 + Ξ$t,
$t = ρ$t−1+εt
where xt = [πt, yt, qt]
′
and $t is a vector of shocks. Exogenous variables are assumed to
follow a first-order stationary VAR with iid innovations and diagonal covariance matrix.
In the absence of any inertial effect in the model economy and the policy reaction function,
REE uniqueness is simply attained if the matrix Γ−1Ω has real parts of eigenvalues lying
inside the unit circle (see Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
To study the stability of the REE under adaptive learning, we follow Evans and
Honkapohja (2001, Chapter 10) and assume that agents utilize a perceived law of motion
(PLM) for xt that corresponds to the minimal state variable (MSV) solution to the
system:
xt = Υ + Π$t.
Agents are assumed to form expectations by relying on the perceived law of motion
(PLM), Etxt+1 = Υ̂+Π̂ρ$t. Consequently, the actual law of motion (ALM) reads as
follows:
xt = Γ
−1Φ + Γ−1Ω (Υ + Πρ$t) +Γ
−1Ξ$t.
The T -mapping from the PLM to the ALM is:
T (Π̂) = Γ−1 (ΩΠρ+ Ξ) ,
T (Υ̂) = Γ−1 (Φ + ΩΥ) .
According to Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the MSV-REE is E-stable when the following







has all roots with real parts less than 1, a necessary and suffi cient condition
for E-stability of the MSV-REE is that J (= Γ−1Ω− I ) has all roots with negative real
parts.
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Appendix C: Proofs and Additional Propositions
Determinacy under a Contemporaneous Data Policy Rule
We assume a general structure for the interest rate rule:
rt = χππt + χyyt + χqqt. (27)
To analyze determinacy and stability under adaptive learning, we report the linearized
economy in compact form:
Γcxt = Φc + ΩcEtxt+1 + Ξc$t.
Proposition 1
Proof. If we set χy = χq = 0, the discount factor β turns out to be one of the three
eigenvalues of Γ−1c Ωc. Under this setting, the NK Phillips curve and the IS curve con-
stitute an autonomous system, in which the matrix of structural parameters associated













The necessary and suffi cient conditions ensuring determinacy are as follows: |Bc| < 1,
and |Ac| < 1 + Bc, where Ac and Bc are the coeffi cients of the characteristic polynomial
of Jc33 (i.e., λ
2 + Acλ+Bc = 0):
Bc ≡
βσ
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
, (28)
Ac ≡
κσχπ (1 + ψ)− σ (1 + β)− κ (σ + η)
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
. (29)
Let us first focus on |Bc| < 1, which translates into:
βσ




σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
> −1. (31)
We start from manipulating (30), multiplying both sides by σ + κχπ (η − σψ): this term
is always positive for ψ < η
σ
. By contrast, when ψ > η
σ
we need to introduce a restriction
on κ to ensure that σ+κχπ (η − σψ) is positive, namely 0 < κ < σχπ(σψ−η) .
34 To derive an
explicit condition for χπ we divide both sides of the resulting inequality by κ (η − σψ).
This term is negative for σψ > η: in this case we end up with χπ <
σ(β−1)
κ(η−σψ) . Otherwise,
when ψ < η
σ
we obtain χπ >
σ(β−1)
κ(η−σψ) . Note that the term on the RHS of the last inequality
34Note that this condition holds under different plausible parameterizations and is always satisfied
under the set of calibrated parameters we consider in the paper.
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is always negative. We now consider (31). Again, to isolate χπ on the LHS we need to




σ (β + 1)
κ (σψ − η) . (32)
When ψ > η
σ
the term σ(β+1)
κ(σψ−η) is always positive under the restriction characterizing the
baseline parameterization. In the alternative case (i.e., ψ < η
σ
), we obtain χπ >
σ(β+1)
κ(σψ−η) :
as the term on the RHS of the last inequality is always negative, this condition is nested
in χπ > 1. Finally, we turn our attention to the second condition for determinacy,
|Ac| < 1 +Bc, which translates into:
κσχπ (1 + ψ)− σ (1 + β)− κ (σ + η)
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
< 1 +
βσ
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
, (33)
κσχπ (1 + ψ)− σ (1 + β)− κ (σ + η)
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
> −1− βσ
σ + κχπ (η − σψ)
. (34)
Once again, we assume that the restriction on κ holds true: this allows us to write (33)
as χπκ (σ (1 + 2ψ)− η) < 2σ (1 + β) + κ (σ + η). Thus, we have to evaluate the sign










κ(σ(1+2ψ)−η) is negative, so that the resulting condition is nested in χπ > 1. Finally, we
consider (34). Algebraic manipulations similar to those followed for (33) lead us to show
that the only relevant condition for determinacy is χπ > 1.
Corollary 1
The conditions reported in Proposition 1 can be re-stated to determine the following
critical values of the pass-through coeffi cient:
1. For ψ < η−σ
2σ
the system is always determinate as long as χπ > χπ = 1;
2. For η−σ
2σ
≤ ψ < σ(1−β)+(κησ
−1+κ+3β+1)η
κσ+4σβ+κη
the response coeffi cient to inflation has to lie








the response coeffi cient to inflation
has to lie in the region between the locus χ̂π and the bottom limit represented by
χπ = 1;




determinacy is never attained.
Proof. Note that χπ always represents the minimum response threshold on the relevant
interval for the pass-through. Alternatively, χ̃π and χ̂π represent the maximum response
thresholds. We examine the conditions reported in Proposition 1 over the {χπ, ψ} sub-




and generally behave as hyperbolae in the
relevant space. As we search for a maximum response threshold, we are interested in those
functions lying on the RHS of the asymptote to each curve. In this region all thresholds





. Thus χ̃π will be first binding from the left. For ψ ≥ ησ two conditions need to
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be fulfilled. First, for ψ > η
σ
we can easily check that (β−1)σ
(η−σψ)κ <
σ(1+β)
κ(σψ−η) , so that the term
on the LHS of the inequality is the relevant threshold. We then compute the value of
ψ at which χ̃π = χ̂π: ψ =
σ(1−β)+(κησ−1+κ+3β+1)η
κσ+4σβ+κη
. Finally, we compute the threshold for
the pass-through parameter above which determinacy is never attained. This occurs at






E-stability under a Contemporaneous Data Policy Rule
Proposition 2
Assume that the central bank implements the rule rt = χππt. Thus, along with χπ >
χπ ≡ 1, the following conditions are necessary to ensure E-stability:
1. For ψ < 1 + 2η
σ
:
χπ > χ̂π =
(1− κ)σ − σβ − κη
(σ (ψ − 1)− 2η)κ
2. For ψ > 1 + 2η
σ
:
χπ < χ̃π =
(1− κ)σ − σβ − κη
(σ (ψ − 1)− 2η)κ
Proof. The following necessary and suffi cient conditions ensure E-stability: B̄c > 0 and
Āc > 0, where Āc and B̄c are the coeffi cients of the characteristic polynomial associated
with Jc33 − I (i.e., λ2 + Ācλ+ B̄c = 0):
B̄c ≡
κ (σ + η) (χπ − 1)
σ + κηχπ − κσψχπ
, (35)
Āc ≡
κσχπ − σ + κσψχπ − κσ + σβ + κη
σ + κηχπ − κσψχπ
+ 2. (36)
Let us first focus on Āc > 0. We multiply each side of this inequality by σ+κχπ (η − σψ).
This term is always positive for ψ < η
σ
. Otherwise, when ψ > η
σ
we need to impose a
restriction on κ to ensure its positiveness, i.e. 0 < κ < σ
χπ(σψ−η)
. Thus, we can rearrange
(36) as (κ− 1)σ + σβ + κη + (σ (ψ − 1)− 2η)κχπ > 0. There are three relevant cases
to be considered: 1 + 2η
σ
< ψ, 1 + 2η
σ
> ψ and 1 + 2η
σ
= ψ. In the first case, the
response to inflation must satisfy the following condition: χπ >
(1−κ)σ−σβ−κη
(σ(ψ−1)−2η)κ . In the
second case, the maximum response to inflation is constrained from above by the following
condition: χπ <
(1−κ)σ−σβ−κη




is κ > (1−β)σ
η+σ
, which is easily satisfied at any conventional parameterization. Finally, we
impose the condition B̄c > 0: as the denominator of (35) is always positive (given the
restriction imposed on κ), this condition is simply satisfied for χπ > 1.
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Determinacy with Forward Expectations in the Policy Function
Proposition 3
Assume that the central bank implements the rule rt = χπEtπt+1. Thus, along with
χπ > χπ = 1, the following conditions are necessary to ensure equilibrium uniqueness:
1. For ψ > −1:
χπ < χ̂π =
1− β
κ (ψ + 1)
(37)
2. For ψ < η−σ
2σ
:
χπ < χ̃π =
2σ (1 + β) + κ (σ + η)
κ (σ + η)− 2κσ (1 + ψ) (38)
Proof. As the central bank does respond neither to asset prices misalignments nor to the
output gap, β is one of the three eigenvalues of Jf . Furthermore, the NK Phillips curve
and the IS constitute an autonomous system in which the matrix of structural parameters
associated to the forward looking vector is represented by the following cofactor:
Jf33 =
[
β + κχπ (ψ + 1)− κσ (χπ − 1) (σ + η) κ (σ + η)
− 1
σ
(χπ − 1) 1
]
.
The necessary and suffi cient conditions ensuring determinacy are |Bf | < 1, and |Af | <
1 +Bf , where Af and Bf are the coeffi cients of the characteristic polynomial of Jf33 (i.e.,
λ2 + Afλ+Bf = 0):




(χπ − 1) (σ + η)− κχπ (ψ + 1)− β − 1
)
. (40)
Let us first focus first on |Bf | < 1, which translates into β + κχπ (ψ + 1) < 1 and








that the term on the RHS is always negative. Let us now focus on |Af | < 1 + Bf . This
can be written as
κ
σ




(χπ − 1) (σ + η) > 0. (42)







− 2 (ψ + 1)
)









− 2κ (ψ + 1), which is positive
for ψ < η−σ
2σ
, in which case we can determine the following constraint for the response
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. Otherwise, when ψ > η−σ
2σ










− 2 (ψ + 1) = 0 the term on the RHS of (43) is always positive and
the inequality is always satisfied, no matter the value of χπ. When exploring (42) it is
immediate to show that χπ > 1 is the relevant constraint.
Corollary 2
The conditions in Proposition 3 can be re-stated to determine the following critical values
of the pass-through:
1. For −1 < ψ ≤ (1−β)(σ+η)
4σ+κ(σ+η)
− 1 the response coeffi cient to inflation has to lie in the
region between the locus χ̃π and the bottom limit represented by χπ = 1.
2. For (1−β)(σ+η)
4σ+κ(σ+η)
− 1 < ψ < 1−β−κ
κ
the response coeffi cient to inflation has to lie in the
region between the locus χ̂π and the bottom limit represented by χπ = 1.
3. For ψ ≥ 1−β−κ
κ
determinacy is never attained.
Proof. We first have to determine the points at which the thresholds implied by (37)




while χ̂π crosses χπ at ψ
b = 1−β−κ
κ
. Note that ψa < −1 and ψa < ψb. Moreover, as χ̃π
increases in ψ it will represent an upper bound to χπ, from ψ = −1 up to the point where
χ̃π crosses χ̂π, namely ψ =
(1−β)(σ+η)
4σ+κ(σ+η)
− 1. We need to show that this point lies on the
LHS of the threshold implied by condition (37), namely η−σ
2σ
. After some tedious algebra
we can prove that this is always the case (under the restriction on κ we have imposed
above). From this point onwards (37) bounds χπ from above, up to the point in which
χ̂π crosses χπ. From this point onwards determinacy can never be attained.
E-stability with Forward Expectations in the Policy Function
Proposition 4
Assume that the central bank implements the rule rt = χπEtπt+1. Thus, along with
χπ > χπ = 1, the following conditions are necessary to ensure E-stability:
1. For ψ < η
σ
:
χπ > χ̂π =
κ (σ + η)− σ (1− β)
κ (η − σψ)
2. For ψ > η
σ
:
χπ < χ̃π =
σ (1− β)− κ (σ + η)
κ (σψ − η)
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Proof. The following necessary and suffi cient conditions ensure E-stability: B̄f > 0 and
Āf > 0, where Āf and B̄f are the coeffi cients of the characteristic polynomial associated










(χπ − 1) (σ + η) . (45)
It is immediate to check that Āf is always greater than zero if χπ > 1. As to (44), this
can be rearranged as (η − σψ)κχπ > κ (σ + η)− σ (1− β). Now, iff ψ < ησ , the relevant
condition reads as χπ >
κ(σ+η)−σ(1−β)
κ(η−σψ) . Otherwise, when ψ >
η
σ
the relevant condition is
χπ <
σ(1−β)−κ(σ+η)
κ(σψ−η) . Finally, if ψ =
η
σ
the relevant condition is κ > (1−β)σ
η+σ
, which is easily
satisfied at any conventional parameterization.
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